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Now so familiar as to risk seeming clichéd, 
“We Shall Overcome” was the paramount 
song of the civil rights movement. “Deep in 
my heart, I do believe that we shall overcome 
some day”: the song spoke to a generation’s 
idealism, solidarity, and optimism in the tran-
scendence of injustice.
It is now practically lost to memory that the 
song enjoyed an equal vitality within the early 
New Left. We Shall Overcome was the official 
songbook title of the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a group 
more important than the better-known 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in 
generating sixties New Left radicalism. When 
Tom Hayden, at age eighteen, traveled south 
from Michigan in 1961 to observe SNCC’s 
efforts to register black voters in Mississippi, 
he returned to write the SDS pamphlet 
Revolution in Mississippi, which, issued in the 
same year as The Port Huron Statement, repro-
duced all the words to “We Shall Overcome” 
on its title page. Joan Baez, twenty-two, sang 
“We Shall Overcome” at the 1963 March 
on Washington, and Pete Seeger sang “We 
Shall Overcome” together with SNCC staff in 
Mississippi during Freedom Summer in 1964.
So popular was the song that President 
Lyndon Baines Johnson mouthed the words 
“We Shall Overcome” in a nationally televised 
address in 1965 to advocate the Voting Rights 
Act, a striking instance of that curious alchemy 
by which the radical becomes mainstream. Yet 
when SNCC’s Bob Moses, historian Staughton 
Lynd, and radical pacifist David Dellinger led 
a march on the White House later in 1965 to 
signal the transformation of the civil rights 
movement into a movement against Johnson’s 
own war in Vietnam, they still sang “We Shall 
Overcome.”
If “We Shall Overcome” seems the quint-
essential song of the sixties, that is only 
through the erasure of its origins in a much 
earlier left. The song first appeared as sheet 
music in 1947 in People’s Songs, a periodical 
Pete Seeger founded after the demise of the 
Almanac Singers that he and Woody Guthrie 
had created to arouse anti-fascist spirits on the 
eve of the Second World War. One of Seeger’s 
associates, Zilphia Horton, had set down the 
words and music as “We Will Overcome” 
in 1947 after she heard it sung by black 
women in the Food and Tobacco Workers, a 
Communist-led union out on strike against 
the American Tobacco Company. Those 
women, in turn, had adapted it from the old 
gospel hymn “I’ll Overcome Someday.”
The song became a staple at rallies 
for Henry Wallace, whose independent 
Progressive Party campaign in 1948 against 
Harry Truman protested the Cold War and 
racial segregation. There the song sustained 
wishful thinking, since far from overcoming, 
the Wallace campaign was the last gasp of 
a Popular Front left soon to be suppressed 
by McCarthyism. Around 1955, the year 
when Seeger was called before the House 
Un-American Activities Committee, the singer, 
in an inspired move, substituted “Shall” for 
“Will,” transforming “We Will Overcome” 
into “We Shall Overcome.” In that iteration 
the song was taught at the civil rights lead-
ership training at Highlander Folk School 
in Monteagle, Tennessee. There, Rosa Parks, 
Septima Clark, and Martin Luther King 
learned the song and transformed it into a 
movement anthem as the civil rights tempo 
quickened with the Montgomery Bus Boycott 
of 1955–56.
What, then, was “We Shall Overcome”? 
Many things at once: a song of the 1940s, 
a song of the 1960s; a song of the Popular 
Front, a song of the New Left; a black spiritual 
adaptation, a folk rendition; a protest song, a 
crossover hit; a song for the picket line, a song 
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for civil rights marches; a song with a history 
and a song that seemed, by the early sixties, to 
be entirely of the moment.
“We Shall Overcome” is emblematic of the 
1960s, whose movements radiated newness 
and youth even as they drew strength from 
deeper and older currents. This nuanced 
reality, however, has been occluded by the 
story sixties radicals told themselves.
Young radicals in the 1960s, seeking to 
demarcate themselves, adopted a narrative 
of progression from what they called the 
Old Left to what they called the New Left. 
Their story went something like this: In 
the 1930s and ’40s, there was an Old Left. 
Centered on the Communist Party, it included 
Trotskyists, Socialists, and others. Shaped by 
the Great Depression, the Old Left was orga-
nized in political parties, typically vanguard 
parties. It saw workers as its constituency, 
pursued common ownership of production, 
and espoused economic radicalism first and 
foremost. Then came 1956, Khrushchev’s 
revelations about Stalin’s atrocities, the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary, and the collapse of the 
American Communist Party. The Old Left’s 
credibility lay in ruins. A New Left kaleido-
scope arose in its place. Movement, not Party, 
was its focal point, affluence, not hard times, 
its context. The New Left sought to transcend 
Cold War categories with a radicalism focused 
on moral and cultural issues—race and war, 
later sexuality and gender—all of which the 
Old Left had compromised on by promising 
to address them “after the revolution.” The 
New Left, by contrast, sought participatory 
democracy in the here and now.
This account held undeniable power. 
Radical youth perceived their cause as new 
in part because any left would be new after 
the fifties. The interruption imposed by 
McCarthyism in the history of American radi-
calism had been severe. In calling themselves 
the New Left, sixties youth sought to conjure 
up a new sensibility as well, one that reflected 
political necessity since the revealed record of 
Stalinism required American radicals, if they 
hoped to retain moral credibility, to distin-
guish themselves from the Soviet Union.
In the process, however, the New Left did 
something not often recognized: it created 
the Old Left. That category functioned to 
emphasize discontinuity in the history of radi-
calism at the expense of understanding the 
ways in which, as with “We Shall Overcome,” 
that history was actually an overlaid one. 
Because social movements achieve widest 
success when they forge solidarity across 
generations, one of the less-appreciated self-
imposed limits of the sixties upsurge was its 
framing bias toward youth.
“Old Left” was a retroactive appellation, 
popular among sixties youth, that evoked 
an image that was at best partial. Certainly, 
nobody at People’s Songs in 1947 thought of 
themselves as Old Left. They were young, 
too—so young, in fact, that Pete Seeger is still 
with us today. But into the Old Left’s maw 
all of the left’s faults and foibles could be 
tossed. That left was reductionist, mechanistic, 
dogmatic. It was not radical enough because it 
was subordinate to the liberalism of the Henry 
Wallaces and Eleanor Roosevelts. It disguised 
itself behind terms like “the people” because 
Seeger and others had failed to be forthright 
about their Communist Party memberships. In 
a word, it was passé.
For reasons both explicit and tacit, the 
vision of a New Left proved attractive. 
Newness was a prominent value in a society 
forever trying to move commodities off the 
shelf, evoking positive associations even in 
the subconscious of those youth alienated 
from the shallowness of consumerism and 
conformity. Red-diaper babies sought to 
Joan Baez sings “We Shall Overcome” at the 1963 Civil 
Rights March on Washington (Rowland Scherman, U.S. 
Information Agency, Wikimedia Commons)
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succeed where their deflated parents had 
not, while southern students influenced by 
existentialist Christianity and northern left-
liberals each had their own reasons to be 
suspicious of the Communist left as well as 
Cold War anti-Communism.
And there was something genuinely 
new and attractive about the New Left. The 
widespread embrace during the 1960s of an 
open-ended radicalism, one as much about 
democracy as political power, about values as 
much as victory, did represent a break from 
the Old Left, as was evident when social 
democrats such as Michael Harrington and 
Irving Howe chastised New Left youth whom 
they saw as naïve, both in an approach to 
politics that tended toward utopianism and 
in their willingness to overlook or downplay 
Communist malevolence. When socialist 
elders had the locks changed in New York 
shortly after the Port Huron convention, 
barring SDSers from their own office, it 
underscored the apparent gulf between Old 
and New.
Fifty years on, however, the distinction 
between Old Left and New Left is of 
distinctly limited value. Its categories simply 
dissolve and disintegrate if put to the test—
as exemplified by the journey of “We Shall 
Overcome.”
Consider the following criticism of 
American politics. Speaking of “the unbe-
lievable degree of apathy and uninterest on 
the part of the American people,” the passage 
reads as if it were taken from the Port Huron 
Statement: “Unless the American people are 
aroused to a higher degree of participation, 
democracy will die at its roots.” But this was 
penned by Saul Alinsky in Reveille for Radicals, 
written in 1946. That book drew on what 
would later be called “Old Left” lexicon in 
speaking of “People’s Organizations.” His was 
a new leftism emerging within the Popular 
Front of the 1940s.
Or consider, from an entirely different 
sector of the left, the sardonic writer who 
mocks the “professional revolutionary”: “The 
deceived masses run away from you and you 
run after them, yelling ‘Stop, stop, stop, you 
proletarian masses! You just can’t see that I am 
your liberator!’” Such would-be “Marxists,” 
says the writer, believe “sexuality is a petit-
bourgeois invention. It is the economic factors 
that count.” This is not Abbie Hoffman, but 
Wilhelm Reich in Listen, Little Man, 1948.
Or what of the writer dismayed to find 
radicalism in America “scattered, demoralized, 
and numerically insignificant”? Because “the 
present high school and college generation 
does not remember the depression,” a revival 
will require “new foundations”:
Radicalism in America must be recruited 
from radicals, from strong and independent 
spirits willing to stand on their own 
choices....A disciplined, maneuverable army 
of the left is, in this country, an absurd 
dream. There is no reason for anybody to 
join it; those who easily accept orders are in 
quite different armies already. Communism 
has failed completely in the United States 
partly because its adherents have not played 
a truly radical role.
Surely this was produced after 1956? But 
no, it’s Henry F. May, “The End of American 
Radicalism,” in American Quarterly in 1950, 
examining the rubble left after the Henry 
Wallace campaign.
Other examples abound of an alternative 
left consciousness sprouting from the cracks 
of the 1940s. Dwight Macdonald spoke 
openly of “a new left.” The Congress of Racial 
Equality pioneered sit-ins and freedom 
rides. C. Wright Mills developed a criticism 
of bureaucracy that owed much to the oppo-
sition to “bureaucratic collectivism,” East and 
West, in Max Shachtman’s circle of Trotskyist-
derived heretical socialists. Staughton Lynd, 
the New Left’s most noted intellectual by the 
mid-1960s and himself a product of the early 
postwar years, once called these 1940s trends 
“the first New Left.”
Or was it the actual New Left? After all, in 
the 1940s such ideas were truly new. By the 
1960s they were long in gestation.
Not only was the New Left old, but the Old 
Left was new. The Old Left generation was not 
simply erased by McCarthyism and Stalinism. 
The Communist Party was discredited, to be 
sure, but this freed a generation of radicals to 
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chart more independent courses after 1956, 
making the 1960s left far more intergenera-
tional than is often acknowledged. It’s not 
just that Pete Seeger records spun on many a 
New Left turntable. Everywhere one looks in 
the 1960s, one finds an adult left in its middle 
years, interacting with youth, contributing to 
sixties radicalism, and collapsing distinctions 
between Old Left and New.
In Los Angeles in 1951, for example, four 
Old Leftists, still young in heart but rejected 
by the Communist Party, formed the first 
sustained American homophile organization: 
the Mattachine Society. By the early 1960s, the 
homophile movement had made a significant 
contribution to the sexual revolution so often 
credited to the New Left at the expense of the 
supposedly economistic Old Left.
Those in Britain who hatched the very term 
New Left—including historian E.P. Thompson, 
whose Making of the English Working Class of 
1963 pioneered a “new” labor history engaged 
with class and culture—were Communists 
who quit in 1956. It was in their New Left 
Review that C. Wright Mills published his 
“Letter to the New Left,” saying that students, 
rather than a “labor metaphysic,” were the 
agents of radical renewal.
Many putatively New Left strategies were 
spawned by Old Left seers. Bayard Rustin, 
Ella Baker, Stanley Levison, and other Old 
Left veterans advised Martin Luther King 
and younger radicals in the southern freedom 
movement. Social democrats at the United 
Auto Workers helped arrange the Port Huron 
camp for SDS in 1962 and donated money 
to make its Economic and Research Action 
Programs possible. Hal Draper, a 1930s 
Trotskyist, gave sage counsel to Mario Savio 
and other student radicals during the Free 
Speech Movement in Berkeley in 1964.
What periodicals did New Leftists read? 
Monthly Review, the National Guardian, and I.F. 
Stone’s Weekly, all launched in the 1940s and 
1950s by remnants of the Popular Front left. 
Or New Politics, edited by left socialist veterans 
of the 1940s and 1950s. Perhaps even the 
Dissent of Irving Howe, onetime Shachtmanite, 
who clashed with the New Left but published 
Tom Hayden, Staughton Lynd, and other new 
radicals.
Malcolm X Speaks, published in 1965, was 
edited by George Breitman, a member of the 
Socialist Workers Party, which was practi-
cally the only organization to give the black 
militant a platform in the last year of his life. 
It was issued by Grove Press, where Harry 
Braverman, another Trotskyist veteran, was 
editor. Would Malcolm’s views have been as 
influential had not older revolutionaries—
Jewish, in this case—arranged for their 
dissemination?
National demonstrations against the 
Vietnam War, although initiated by SDS in 
1965, were mostly organized by a coalition 
of older radicals in the National Mobilization 
Committee to End the War in Vietnam, headed 
by radical pacifist A. J. Muste, whose activism 
dated back to the First World War. Prominent 
intellectual opponents of the Vietnam War 
included Norman Mailer, Noam Chomsky, 
Howard Zinn, and Sidney Lens, all of whom 
came of age on the 1940s left.
Even Black Power fits the template. Stokely 
Carmichael, who popularized that slogan 
more than anyone else, was a Trinidadian 
immigrant whose initiation into radical 
politics came through his close friendship at 
the Bronx High School of Science with Eugene 
Dennis, son and namesake of the American 
Communist Party leader. Black Power radicals 
James and Grace Lee Boggs came out of 
Detroit’s labor left of the 1930s and ’40s, while 
Harold Cruse, who did so much to promote 
black nationalism and stigmatize the Old Left, 
had once been a Communist. In England, the 
Trinidadian C.L.R. James, a Trotskyist since 
the 1930s, counseled black militant pan-Afri-
canists of the 1960s.
Or take the women’s movement. It was 
indubitably new in scale, innovation, and 
independence in the 1960s, and the left in the 
1930s and ’40s did subsume gender within 
class when discussing “the Woman Question,” 
“Old Left” was a retroactive appellation, 
popular among sixties youth, that evoked 
an image that was at best partial.
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but New Left men responded with even less 
comprehension when women began to assert 
the need for sexual equality in the 1960s. Old 
Left women, moreover, helped spawn the 
new feminism in ways direct and indirect. 
Although McCarthyism buried the memory of 
initiatives such as the Congress of American 
Women, which in the late 1940s pushed for 
child care, equal pay, and other demands 
that would later be called feminist, CAW 
veterans in the 1960s such as Eleanor Flexner 
and Gerda Lerner pioneered the writing of 
women’s history while Women Strike for 
Peace, formed by Old Left women, contributed 
to a rebirth of women’s political action.
When the young white civil rights orga-
nizers Casey Hayden and Mary King wrote 
two memos in SNCC and SDS that were the 
first serious documents on women in the 
New Left, objecting to sexism within those 
organizations, they read older women who 
were making themselves anew: Simone 
de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (1949), Doris 
Lessing’s The Golden Notebook (1962), and 
Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963). 
Friedan masked her background in the left-led 
electrical workers’ union, UE, with a fable of 
middle-class suburban life, and her Popular 
Front ethos was too tame for women’s libera-
tionists, but her criticism of rigid Cold War 
gender norms sewed seeds of radical women’s 
consciousness.
Many recent histories of American 
Communism fail to register how gravely 
Stalinism distorted the left of the 1930s and 
’40s, a factor just as important as McCarthyism 
in necessitating the disguises adopted by the 
Seegers and Friedans of the time. Democratic 
radicals and revolutionary socialists observed 
those failings at the time, the fundamental 
differences among rival camps of radicalism 
being another reason why “Old Left” holds 
little value as an all-encompassing term. 
There is, however, ample evidence that even 
the Communist left was hardly contemptible 
on every issue, as historians have charted the 
many positive contributions of 1930s and ’40s 
radicals on labor, fascism, empire, and espe-
cially race—which the Old Left cannot now be 
said to have waited until “after the revolution” 
to address.
Ideas bracketed as “Old Left,” moreover, 
remained live options throughout the 1960s, 
which hardly saw all of the older folkways 
dispelled. One is found in the later New Left’s 
attempt, in a decade of war and revolution, 
to “name the system,” as SDSer Paul Potter 
put it. That process led many to see “capi-
talism” and “imperialism” not as stale, musty 
words but as accurate descriptors at that very 
moment, when the American business class 
was reclaiming the word “capitalism” and 
investing it with positive connotations.
Once capitalism and imperialism came 
into sight again for the left, as Carl Oglesby 
observed, it was certain that young radicals 
would work their way back to Marx and 
Lenin. In this there was plenty of insight, 
not only tragedy, for the turn to theory and 
history signaled recognition of social systems 
and structures that would not be displaced 
by moral symbolic action alone. It is also 
the case, however, that a good part of the 
New Left in the end succumbed to the Old 
Left’s worst errors and deficiencies: scriptural 
fundamentalism, bureaucratic centralisms, 
and simplistic versions of internationalism 
revolving around a single sun, whether China, 
Cuba, Algeria, or, worse, Albania or North 
Korea.
Here again the sunny contrast between 
New Left innocence and Old Left bankruptcy 
is shown to be overdrawn. Newness and 
youth did not guarantee purity. Some errors 
of the New Left, such as its Weatherman-style 
adventurism, were catastrophic beyond any 
faults committed by the once-disdained Old 
Left. At the same time, the later New Left 
fostered new liberations in culture, sexuality, 
and gender beyond those the early New Left 
had wrested, and much of it came to under-
stand, however belatedly, that working-class 
majorities are the crux of lasting transforma-
tions. Even as the New Left suffered fissures 
and crises by the 1970s, it showed greater 
humility toward its older counterparts on the 
left, recasting them as long-distance runners 
who faced similar predicaments and chal-
lenges.
When talking to millennials, anyone above 
the age of forty will hit a moment when a vast 
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sinkhole seems to open up, with all points of 
cultural reference dropping through. Perhaps 
you find yourself at a seminar table of twenty-
somethings rambling on about punk’s halcyon 
days and refer to Patti Smith’s variation of 
“Gloria,” only to realize that no one knows 
what you are talking about. They don’t know 
Patti Smith. They don’t even know “Gloria.” 
They certainly don’t know its origins in Van 
Morrison’s early garage band Them. Finally, 
you blurt something out about “Brown-Eyed 
Girl,” a recognition flickers, and Van Morrison 
allows the regaining of a precarious toehold in 
cultural history.
Should this surprise us? The 1960s are now 
two decades farther from our time than they 
were from the 1930s, and the New Left is old 
in a new way. The times, they have a-passed. 
The next generation inevitably has its own 
points of reference. They do take interest in 
the flurry of fiftieth-anniversary commemora-
tions now erupting, since the epochal shift of 
the sixties continues to exert an attraction, but 
we are witnessing the final draining of the 
wash of ’68, and any future American left will 
have different contours and identities.
For decades unprecedented in the history 
of American radicalism, a single generation’s 
myths and legends have held sway over 
others. Boomer dominance prevailed even as, 
from South African divestment in the 1980s 
to AIDS resistance to the global justice Battle 
of Seattle in 1999, outbursts tossed up newly 
radicalized youth. No subsequent cohort 
emerged with numbers or ideas sufficient 
to surpass the New Left generation, whose 
glory days, cautionary tales, and balance of 
left leadership power held sway over the 
radical, or once-radical, imagination. The 
consequences for memory were illustrated this 
past year when the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Port Huron Statement was marked at a spurt of 
events across the country while the hundredth 
anniversary of the 1912 campaign of Socialist 
Eugene Victor Debs passed entirely unob-
served.
Debs was part of what might be called, 
to adapt Lynd’s phrase, the first Old Left, 
winning a higher percentage of the presi-
dential vote in 1912 than any American 
socialist before or since. Many of the assump-
tions of American socialism in its heyday now 
seem naïve, if not retrograde. It was largely, 
though not exclusively, male-dominated at 
a time before women were guaranteed the 
ballot; it was prone to talk of class unity 
alone at a time when black Americans were 
being lynched and stripped of voting rights. 
Electoral socialism does not resonate so well 
with a contemporary left steeped more in 
anarchism than Marxism. In these respects 
the New Left may still present a fresher 
model. Other aspects of the Debsian vision, 
though, surely speak as well, if not better, to 
our era: its imagining of a fighting left, one 
opposed to war and exploitation, inclusive 
of revolutionary visions and social reform 
alike; its multigenerational combinations; its 
commitment to effective organization; its bent 
toward economic democracy against immense 
inequality. In some respects its old credo is 
neglected (or is the word impermissible?) 
not for its faults and archaisms but because it 
remains so radical and relevant.
That lineage may revive in trace form 
in future lefts, now that Occupy, however 
fleeting, has put class and inequality again on 
a new generation’s radar. It informed even the 
New Left, however, which for all its affluent 
context cannot be understood without its 
roots in a Debsian vision of equality. SDS in 
its earliest years focused on poverty in the 
Economic and Research Action Programs, and 
various New Left voices—James Weinstein at 
Studies on the Left and Socialist Revolution, Paul 
Buhle’s Radical America—sought a socialism 
rooted in American realities, imbued with 
the cumulative insights of subsequent liber-
atory radicalisms. Such is perhaps the vein 
of radical thought and action now being 
reclaimed by those seeking alternatives to the 
bubble-and-bust capitalism of our new Gilded 
The sunny contrast between New Left 
innocence and Old Left bankruptcy is 
shown to be overdrawn. Newness and 
youth did not guarantee purity.
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Age.
If the New Left was old, and the Old Left 
was new, if neither were faultless and neither 
irredeemable, if both remain attractive but 
neither can be transferred tout court to our 
present, if their evaluation and appraisal was 
never made easier by seeking to box them 
up tightly in neat chronologically divided 
compartments, then perhaps this leaves us 
with a story of a common left, a long left, a 
left that stretches far back in time all the way 
up to our present, one subject to tragic flaws 
but animated, at its best, by the enduring 
ideals of democracy, freedom, and equality. 
Contingents of radicals to come will generate 
their own fables of newness while staking 
claims to this heritage that arcs back to 1776 
and the abolitionists. Always the left has 
had continuities and ruptures, innovations 
and borrowings, solidarities and betrayals, 
legacies to draw upon, errors to discard. If 
future lefts synthesize the best of the old, 
experiment anew, draw upon the verve of 
youth and the perspective of age, and succeed 
in speaking to their present, casting the left’s 
ideals in a parlance and fashion suited to their 
moment, then perhaps someday we might 
well overcome.
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